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ABSTRACT
While the theoretical literature on non-cooperative legislative bargaining has grown voluminous,
there is little empirical work attempting to test a key prediction in this literature: proposal power is
valuable. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by investigating the role of proposal power
in the allocation of transportation projects across U.S. Congressional districts in 1991 and 1998. The
evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of the Baron and Ferejohn legislative bargaining
model: members with proposal power, those sitting on the transportation authorization committee,
secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives. Support for the
quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power, which are more powerful than the
qualitative restrictions, is more mixed. I then empirically address several alternative models of
legislative behavior, including partisian models, informational roles for committees, models with
appropriations committees, and theories of committees as preference outliers.
Brian Knight
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brian_knight@brown.edu“Our oﬃce was approached and oﬀered $15 million for projects in Tulsa, and I told
them my vote was not for sale. It was just $15 million, dangling, cash for projects
in the 1st Congressional District”
U.S. Rep. Steve Largent (R, OK).1
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
While the theoretical literature on non-cooperative legislative bargaining has grown voluminous,
there is little empirical work attempting to test a key prediction in this literature: proposal
power is valuable. This paper aims to ﬁll this gap in the literature by investigating the role of
proposal power in the allocation of Congressionally earmarked transportation projects across
Congressional districts in 1991 and 1998. Throughout the legislative process, the transportation
committee was granted signiﬁcant proposal powers, thereby allowing for a direct test of this
theoretical prediction.
For several reasons, Congressional negotiations over the allocation of transportation funds
are well suited to an empirical test of predictions from non-cooperative bargaining models.
First, these episodes meet the classic deﬁnition of a bargaining situation, which exists when
agents engaged in negotiations have a common interest in agreement but conﬂicting prefer-
ences over the terms of agreement (Muthoo, 1999). While there was widespread interest
within Congress in funding these transportation projects, there was sharp disagreement and
signiﬁcant controversy over the cross-district allocation, which, in the end, was skewed for the
beneﬁt of members of the transportation committee. Second, while payoﬀsa r ed i ﬃcult to
measure in many bargaining environments, the distribution of transportation projects across
Congressional districts is both observable and publicly available. Third, the stakes involved
in Congressional bargaining tend to be large. The funding for the transportation projects
examined here totaled $5 billion in 1991 and $8 billion in 1998, and these funds translate into
increased re-election probabilities. Levitt and Snyder (1997) estimate that an additional $100
per capita in federal spending is worth as much as 2 percentage points of the popular vote
for the incumbent in Congressional elections. Fourth, these funds were earmarked for spe-
ciﬁc projects in Congressional districts, rather than distributed to states according to formula,
giving representatives signiﬁcant discretion over the allocation of project spending across dis-
tricts. Finally, while bargaining procedures are diﬃcult to discern in many economic settings,
Congressional procedures of voting and proposals are well documented and correspond in a
reasonable way to the process outlined in bargaining models.
1Transcript from The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, March 30, 1998.
2The empirical speciﬁcation in this paper adheres as closely as possible to the non-cooperative
legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989, 1993), which is itself closely related to
the seminal bargaining model of Rubinstein (1983). I incorporate only the following necessary
modiﬁcations to the Baron and Ferejohn model: committees of multiple representatives, rather
than a single proposer, and recognition probabilities that vary across representatives. This
paper ﬁrst provides a simple test of the predictions of this legislative bargaining model regarding
the value of proposal power. The evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of the
legislative bargaining model: members with proposal power, those sitting on the transportation
committee, secure higher project spending than do other districts. Support for the quantitative
predictions, which are more powerful than the qualitative predictions, is more mixed. I then
empirically address several alternative theories of legislative organization and behavior.
2 Related Literature
A related empirical literature has documented a positive correlation between federal spending
in jurisdictions and representation by politically powerful Congressional delegations. Ferejohn
(1974) ﬁnds that states with Congressional representatives on relevant committees, especially
those with tenure or in the majority party, received more water projects than other states.
Atlas et. al (1995) show that inequality in per-capita political clout, due in part to each state
having two Senators regardless of population, has predictable and signiﬁcant eﬀects on the
distribution of federal spending, net of federal taxes, across states. Levitt and Poterba (1999)
ﬁnd that states with powerful representatives, captured through seniority and service on in-
ﬂuential committees, experienced more rapid economic growth than states with less powerful
delegations. My empirical analysis of transportation projects oﬀers several advantages over
this existing literature. First, I correct for the possibility of preference outliers among the
transportation committee members using ﬁxed eﬀects and instrumental variables approaches.
Second, the theoretically-guided approach used in my paper allows for a more powerful test
of the model. In addition to the qualitative predictions examined in the existing literature,
the theoretical legislative bargaining model provides quantitative restrictions on the value of
proposal power. Finally, I consider speciﬁc Congressional bargaining episodes, tightening the
connection between the theoretical model of legislative bargaining and the empirical analy-
sis. The previous literature has tended to aggregate bargaining outcomes across either federal
spending programs or time.2
2A related literature studies the relationship between political power and electoral outcomes. Milyo (1997)
ﬁnds that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget rules, which increased the power of the Budget committees
relative to the Approprations commitees, led to both an increase in campaign contributions to members of the
3A second related literature studies bargaining over the formation of coalition governments
in Europe, with a speciﬁc focus on the timing of agreements and government stability. While
the bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn predicts immediate agreement, Merlo and Wilson
(1995) construct a bargaining model in which the discounted total surplus is stochastic and thus
may increase in future rounds of bargaining, creating incentives to delay agreement. Merlo
(1997) and Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo (2001) estimate the parameters of stochastic bar-
gaining models and ﬁnd that the model explains well data on the timing, size, and durations of
coalitions. Overall, this literature is complementary to my analysis. While these papers focus
on the timing of agreements and government stability, I assume (and observe) that agreement
i sr e a c h e di nt h eﬁrst round of bargaining and focus on measuring distributive properties of
agreements, namely the value of proposal power.
Finally, there is a large literature on bargaining experiments, which is surveyed by Roth
(1995). Most relevant to this paper is Frechette, Kagel, and Lehrer (2000), who conduct
classroom experiments designed to test legislative bargaining models. They ﬁnd support for
the qualitative predictions of the model: if legislative rules permit amendments, agreement is
reached less quickly, coalitions are larger, and beneﬁts are more evenly distributed. However, as
is often the case in bargaining experiments, proposers consistently provide themselves less than
what the model predicts. Again, I view my approach as complementary to the experimental
approach. Disadvantages of the approach using ﬁeld data include the lack of direct control over
the bargaining procedures and the possibility of logrolling across federal spending programs; this
latter issue could play an important role in the equilibrium coalition that emerges with respect
to a single issue. Advantages of my approach using ﬁeld data are twofold. First, relative to
the bargaining surplus in experimental settings, which is typically less than 100 dollars, the
transportation projects considered here totaled in the billions of dollars. Second, while agents
in experimental settings are often unfamiliar with the bargaining procedures, Congressional
representatives are experts in their ﬁeld, having signiﬁcant experience with and knowledge of
legislative procedures.
3 Transportation projects
In the United States, the federal government provides closed-end, or capped, matching grants to
state governments for highway construction and maintenance. These grants are paid from the
Highway Trust Fund, into which federal gasoline tax receipts are deposited. Historically, the
federal government has allocated highway grants to state governments according to a formula
that depends upon state characteristics. The recipient government then decides how to allocate
Budget Committee and a reduction in the vote share of members of the Appropriations Committee.
4these funds among speciﬁc projects, subject to the constraint that projects are designated as
part of the Federal Highway Aid System. Recently, rather than delegating to states this
authority to allocate funds across projects, Congress has earmarked a signiﬁcant portion of
these funds for speciﬁc projects. The U.S. House of Representatives authorized $5 billion for
earmarked projects in 1991 and $8 billion in 1998.
The process through which these projects were allocated was highly political, with members
of the transportation authorization committee granted signiﬁcant proposal power. Represen-
tatives ﬁrst submitted project requests and associated funding levels to the committee, which
then accepted, rejected or modiﬁed these requests in its proposed distribution of project spend-
ing. In 1998, several representatives claimed to have received calls during this process from
committee staﬀ who oﬀered them project funding in exchange for their support for the bill.3
In addition to having signiﬁcant control over the initial allocation of projects, the committee
and its proposal faced little or no competition once the measure was brought to the House ﬂoor.
The authorization bill was considered under a modiﬁed closed rule, which sharply limited the
number of amendments under consideration. While over 50 amendments were submitted for
consideration in 1991 and over 30 were submitted in 1998, only a handful, twelve in 1991
and six in 1998, were deemed in order by the Rules Committee and voted on by the entire
House.4 Although no member was allowed to submit an alternative, or competing, list of
projects, Rep. Lindsey Graham (R, SC) was permitted to submit an amendment that would
have stripped in total these projects from the bill in 1998. The amendment failed 79-337 on
April 1, 1998, and the earmarked projects were included in the ﬁnal version of the bill passed
in the House. There was a strong correlation between support for the legislation and project
spending; one source familiar with the process in 1998 claimed that any lawmaker who voted
against the bill on the House ﬂoor would lose his road project.5 While the Senate added
projects during both conference committees, the bulk of projects authorized were those passed
in the House. Presidents Bush and Clinton had threatened to veto the entire authorization
bill over the inclusion of these projects, but both signed the legislation in the end.
3Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1998.
4Congressional Quarterly Almanac and Bureau of National Aﬀairs, Daily Report for Executives, March 31,
1998.
5Tulsa World, March 25, 1998.
54 Legislative Bargaining Model
4.1 Setup
Consider ﬁrst the canonical legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn.6 The legisla-
ture consists of Nd (odd) districts, subscripted by d, and each district is represented by a single
legislator. This legislature determines the cross-district distribution of projects from a ﬁxed
budget of size G, which can be interpreted as the surplus in the Highway Trust Fund. Payoﬀs
depend upon the project size (gd) in district d and the time period (t) in which agreement is
reached:
U(gd,t)=δtgd (1)
where δ ∈ [0,1] is the common discount factor.7 A discount factor less than one may be
interpreted in several ways: constituent impatience, uncertain re-election prospects for repre-
sentatives, or simply an opportunity cost of continued bargaining.8
The legislative process is represented as a non-cooperative bargaining game with inﬁnite
horizon. The legislative procedures for a three-member legislature are depicted in Figure
1. In the ﬁrst stage, a proposer is recognized and puts forward a distribution of projects
[g =( g1,g 2,...,g Nd)]. This proposal cannot exceed the budget [
Nd P
d=1
gd ≤ G] and must consist
of non-negative project sizes [gd ≥ 0, all d]. Under a closed rule, the proposer has gatekeeping
power; that is, no legislator can oﬀer an amendment to the proposal. Given a proposal, all
legislators vote over whether or not to accept the proposed distribution of funds or to continue
the bargaining process. If a majority of legislators vote in favor, the proposal is implemented;
otherwise, another proposer is recognized to oﬀer a distribution of projects. This process
continues until a proposal is approved.
6Applications of the legislative bargaining model include comparative politics (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini,
2000), federalism (Besley and Coate, 2000 Lockwood, 1998, and Knight, 2001), intergovernmental transfers
(Knight, 2002), legislative elections (Chari, Jones, and Marimon, 1997 and Coate, 1997), legislative seniority
(McKelvey and Riezman, 1992), pork barrel ineﬃciencies (Baron, 1991), social choice (Banks and Duggan,
2000), special interest politics (Persson, 1998, Persson and Tabellini, 2002, Helpman and Persson, 2001 and
Bennedsen and Feldman, 2001), tax expenditures (Dharmapala, 1999), and public investment goods (Leblanc,
Snyder, and Tripathi, 2000).
7While utility in this speciﬁcation is linear in money, Bernheim, Rangel, and Rayo (2001) generalize this
legislative bargaining model to incorporate non-transferrable utility. Also, their model has more general dynamic
procedures (namely a policy development stage).
8Note that, in contrast to Rubinstein’s model, whatever the interpretation, a discount factor less than one
is not required for the existence of an equilibrium. Even with a discount factor equal to one, the possibility of
exclusion from future coalitions creates some political impatience.
6Since proposal power is valuable in equilibrium, each representative will seek to be recog-
nized. To resolve this tension, Baron and Ferejohn adopt a random recognition rule ﬁrst
suggested by Binmore (1982). Under a simple version of the rule, which is employed by Baron
and Ferejohn, each legislator is recognized in each period with equal probability (1/Nd). This
recognition rule will be generalized to include heterogeneous recognition probabilities below.
4.2 Equilibrium characterization
Baron and Ferejohn restrict attention to the unique stationary, subgame perfect equilibrium.9
In order to have his proposed budget implemented, the proposer must form a coalition, deﬁned
as the collection of non-proposers receiving positive project spending, of minimum size (Nd −
1)/2. Non-proposers will support the proposed allocation if the associated payment meets
or exceeds the discounted value from continued bargaining, which, given the symmetry of the
game in future rounds, equals δG
Nd. In order to minimize the cost of forming a coalition, the
proposer forms a minimum winning coalition, whose members receive exactly their discounted
continuation value:




Nc =( Nd − 1)/2 (3)
where Vc represents the value to coalition members and Nc denotes the coalition size. Since
agreement is reached in the ﬁrst period, legislators excluded from the coalition receive no
payments and the proposer receives the residual:
V−c = g−c =0 (4)




where Vp is the value to the proposer. Finally, the value of proposal power (Vp −V−p),t h ek e y
measure in the empirical analysis, is given as follows:







9While Rubinstein shows that a subgame perfect equilibrium exists and is unique in bilateral bargaining games,
Baron and Ferejohn prove a folk theorem for their multilateral, majority-rule game. Given that legislators are
suﬃciently patient, any division of the surplus can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium. However, only
one of these equilibria is stationary, or time independent. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) argue that non-stationary
equilibria involve overly complex strategies, and thus restrict focus to the unique stationary equilibrium, which
is supported by relatively simple strategies. Baron and Kalai (1993) formalize these notions of complexity and
simplicity.
7A ss h o w ni ne q u a t i o n6 ,t h ep r o p o s e ru s e st h ei m p atience of other legislators and his ability to
exclude legislators from the coalition in order to secure an above-average share of the bargaining
surplus.
4.3 Extensions
Consider next two extensions of the model, which are made for the purpose of empirical im-
plementation. First, given that proposal power in Congress rests in committees, which have
multiple members, I generalize the model from a single proposer to a proposal committee (P),
a collection of Np representatives. Denote membership on the committee by the indicator vari-
able Pd =1 [ d ∈ P]. From the members of this committee, a single representative, denoted the
proposer, is recognized, each with probability 1/Np, and puts forward a distribution of projects.
Given my aim to explain funding diﬀerences between committee and non-committee districts
in a simple model, an equal-sharing rule is assumed within the committee: the proposer is
required to provide equal funding to each committee member, including himself. The role of
this assumption is explored later in this section.
Second, Baron and Ferejohn focus on equal recognition probabilities, an assumption that
seems overly strong. Consider a generalized recognition rule, under which non-members in
period t are selected to the proposal committee in period t+1with probability q ∈ [0,
Np
Nd−Np],
and members are selected with probability 1 − q(Nd − Np)/Np.10 The transition matrix
associated with this Markov process is provided in Table 1. In order for the upper bound on
q to be less than unity, it must be the case that Np <N d/2; as will be shown, this condition
holds empirically.
Appendix A provides a complete solution to the extended model. The equilibrium outcome
can be summarized as follows:





Np(Nd − Np − δNc)+δqNcNd
¸
(7)
Nc + Np =( Nd +1 ) /2 (8)
10Ideally, one would use data from Congress on recognition probabilities. Unfortunately, given that the com-
mittee’s proposal was adopted in the ﬁrst vote in both cases, future recognition probabilities are unobservable.
There are several possible interpretations of q. First, this may capture the possibility of jurisdictional bat-
tles between committees over the distribution of federal funds; such battles, which have largely been won by
authorizers, are described more fully in section 6. In particular, the authorization committee may have been
concerned that a protracted authorization process would increase the control of the appropriations committee,
leading to unauthorized appropriations and thus less control for authorizers over the geographic distribution of
federal funds. Second, q may capture the likelihood of individual transfers onto the transportation committees
in future legislative sessions. See Groseclose and Stewart (1998) for an empirical analysis of such transfers.
8V−c = g−c =0 (9)




Np(Nd − Np − (1 − q)δNc)
Np(Nd − Np − δNc)+δqNcNd
¸
(10)
The value of proposal power, which forms the basis for the empirical analysis, can be expressed
as follows:




Np(Nd − Np − δNc)
Np(Nd − Np − δNc)+δqNcNd
¸
> 0 (11)
As shown in equation (11), members of the proposal committee use both the impatience of
other legislators and their ability to exclude representatives from the winning coalition in order
to secure an above-average share of the bargaining surplus. Note that an increase in proposal
rights (q), a source of bargaining power for non-committee members, is associated with an
increase in payments to members of the coalition (Vc) and a decrease in the value of proposal
power (Vp − V−p).
While Baron and Ferejohn’s model is obviously a special case of this extended model (Np =1
and q = Np/Nd), Table 2 demonstrates that this extended model nests two other prominent
bargaining models. Rubinstein studies two-player bargaining (Nd =2 )with a unanimity re-
quirement (Nc =1 )and alternating oﬀers (q =1 ) .I n t h i s c a s e , t h e p r o p o s e r o ﬀers δG/(1+δ)
to the other player and keeps a larger amount [G/(1 + δ)] for his home district. In the ulti-
matum game, non-proposers have no prospects of future recognition (q =0 ) , and thus receive
zero spending.
While the assumption of an equal sharing rule within the committee is restrictive, Appendix
B, which constructs a model that incorporates within-committee bargaining, demonstrates that
the key qualitative prediction, a positive value of proposal power, does not depend on this
equal sharing assumption. Further, under certain parameter restrictions, the quantitative
predictions are robust to a model of within-committee bargaining. In this extended model, the
proposer is not bound by the equal sharing rule but must instead secure majority support within
the committee before bringing the proposal to the ﬂoor for a vote by the entire legislature.
If future proposal rights for non-committee members are suﬃciently high (q>N p/Nd),t h e
votes of committee members are cheaper to secure and, similarly to the baseline model, the
proposer prefers to provide zero funding to only non-committee members. In this case, both
the qualitative and quantitative predictions regarding the value of proposal power are identical
to those of the baseline model. For the case of low future proposal rights [q<N p/Nd],t h e
votes of non-committee members are cheaper to secure, and the proposer oﬀers zero funding to
(Np − 1)/2 committee members. Thus, this extended model with low future proposal rights
predicts that roughly one-half of committee members will be excluded from the coalition and
9will do substantially worse than a subset of non-committee members, namely those who are
included in the coalition. Ex-post, these excluded committee members receive payoﬀso fz e r o ,
and thus the ex-ante, or average, value of proposal power, which is the primary focus of the




In order to match each of the projects with a Congressional district, I relied on the project de-
scription in the bill. These descriptions provide a city or county name, which could be matched
with a district in the Congressional District Atlas. For those cities or counties with multiple
districts, I used a variety of additional sources, including maps from the Atlas, testimony before
the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, and press releases from representatives’ websites.
Some projects could not be assigned to a speciﬁc district, either due to the project being located
in multiple districts or insuﬃcient information in the project description. Given this lack of
information, I simply exclude these projects from the analysis.11 Finally, project spending is
converted into 1998 dollars. Since the projects authorized in 1998 cover the years 1998-2003,
I use a discount rate of 2.7 percent, the average inﬂation rate between 1990 and 1999.
Table 3 provides summary statistics by year and committee representation. In both au-
thorization years, committee members received signiﬁcantly more project spending than non-
committee members. Committee members tend to be from more rural districts and from
districts with slightly lower income, relative to non-committee members. As shown near the
bottom of Table 3, committee members tend to have less political power in general: they have
served fewer years in Congress and are less likely to chair another committee. These diﬀer-
ences suggest the possibility of selection onto the transportation committee based upon observed
characteristics. The empirical analysis to follow will control for these observed diﬀerences and
also attempt to control for unobserved diﬀerences using ﬁxed eﬀects and instrumental variables
techniques.
Figures 2 and 3 depict the distribution of transportation projects by year and committee
representation. While almost all committee members received at least some project spending,
11There were 56 projects coded as spanning multiple districts (totaling $1.468 billion) in 1991 and 145 projects
(totalling $824 million) in 1998. As a robustness check on the decision to omit these projects from the baseline
analysis, I estimated alternative speciﬁcations that allocated the project spending equally among the relevant
districts. Results of these regressions, not reported here, provided similar estimates of the value of proposal
power.
1072 percent of non-committee members in 1991 and 21 percent in 1998 were excluded from the
coalition. Committee members and non-members averaged $55 billion and $6 billion, respec-
tively, in 1991 and $38 and $14 million, respectively, in 1998. In both ﬁgures, the empirical
distribution of projects for committee members has a spike around $35 million. While there is
certainly variation around these spikes, especially in 1991, this evidence provides some support
for the assumption in the baseline model of an equal sharing rule within the committee. Re-
garding the extended model, which allowed for within-committee bargaining, the homogeneity
of payments within the committee demonstrates that very few committee members received
zero payments and is thus supportive of the caseo fh i g hp r o p o s a lr i g h t sf o rn o n - c o m m i t t e e
members (q). This high value of proposal rights is a somewhat surprising result as, a priori,
low proposal rights seem most reasonable given the likelihood that a rejected proposal would
be returned to the same committee for reconsideration. Unfortunately, this issue cannot be
addressed directly as future recognition probabilities are inherently unobservable given that the
committee’s proposal was adopted in the ﬁrst vote in both years.
5.2 Coalition sizes
The theoretical model suggests two possible measures of coalition sizes: 1) the proportion of
representatives voting in favor of the committee’s proposal, and 2) the proportion of districts
receiving positive project spending. Using either measure, the model predicts minimum win-
ning coalitions. Unfortunately, the ﬁrst measure can only be incorporated in 1998 given that,
in 1991, Congress voted only over the entire authorization bill and thus no separate vote was
recorded over the earmarked projects. During the 1998 authorization, a separate vote, in the
form of an amendment to strip the earmarked projects from the larger bill, was permitted; a
signiﬁcant majority (337 to 79) voted to reject this amendment, and thus fund the projects,
suggesting an oversized coalition.12 Using the alternative, spending-based measure, the coali-
tion was close to majoritarian in 1991, with committee and coalition members totaling 200
districts, or 46 percent of all districts. By contrast, the coalition in 1998 was over-sized, with
committee and coalition members totaling 357 districts, or 82 percent of all districts.
Of course, one could also view the over-sized nature of the 1998 coalition using both the
voting-based and spending-based measures as a rejection of the assumptions, rather than the
predictions, of this model. One possible interpretation for this over-sized coalition involves
competing vote buyers. In an alternative legislative bargaining model, Groseclose and Snyder
12Knight (2003) demonstrates a strongly positive relationship between district project spending and support
for the funding of these projects in the vote over the 1998 amendment. The positive correlation between project
spending and voting patterns demonstrates that the two measures suggested by the theoretical model are closely
related.
11(1996) argue that over-sized coalitions are cheaper to form than are bare majority coalitions
in the presence of competing vote buyers. In particular, if vote buyers move sequentially, and
if the losing buyer is always granted a ﬁnal opportunity to attack the winner’s coalition, then
minimum winning coalitions will not necessarily be the cheapest and equilibrium coalitions will
not generally be of minimum size. There were at least three possible competing vote buyers in
negotiations over the 1998 passage of the transportation authorization bill. The ﬁrst potential
competitor was Rep. Lindsey Graham (R, SC), who, as noted above, was permitted to oﬀer an
amendment that would have stripped the projects in total from the bill. Noting this opposition
to the projects in 1998, the large size of the coalition may reﬂect the committee’s desire to
command widespread political support within the U.S. House, thus undermining this eﬀort in
the House to remove such projects from the bill. Second, some representatives viewed the
Senate bill, which at least initially contained no earmarked projects, as a possible competitor.
Third, as noted above, President Clinton had threatened to veto the entire transportation
authorization bill over the inclusion of these earmarked transportation projects. Thus, the
committee may have wanted a veto proof coalition size. Given the two-thirds requirement to
override a Presidential veto, however, this veto threat seems unable to explain the very large
coalition in which 82 percent of all districts receiving at least some project funding.
5.3 Value of Proposal Power: Baseline Estimates
The remainder of this section takes coalition sizes as given and more formally tests predictions
related to the value of proposal power. For empirical purposes, consider project spending in
district d as a function of committee membership:
gd = α + βPd + ud (12)
where α and β represent parameters to be estimated and ud is a mean-zero unobservable. The
parameter β represents the value of proposal power [that is, β = E(gd|Pd =1 )− E(gd|Pd =





Np(Nd − Np − δNc)
Np(Nd − Np − δNc)+δqNcNd
¸
(13)
Qualitatively, the theoretical model predicts that the value of proposal power is positive
(β > 0). As a test of this prediction, Table 4 provides baseline OLS estimates of the value of
proposal power.13 As shown in columns (1) and (2), the qualitative prediction regarding the
positive value of proposal power is supported empirically as the coeﬃcient on the committee
13This OLS estimator assumes homoskedasticity. The theoretical model suggests heteroskedasticity, as var(gd
| Pd =0 )> var(gd | Pd =1 )=0by the equal sharing rule within the committee. To address this issue,
12membership indicator is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in both 1991 and 1998. Moreover,
the R-squared of 0.2459 in 1991 and 0.2959 in 1998 demonstrates that committee membership
alone explains a signiﬁcant share of the distribution of these projects. This R-squared is quite
high, given the reliance on cross-sectional data and an indicator as the sole right hand side
variable.
While this qualitative prediction has been veriﬁed in the existing literature, such as in
Ferejohn (1974), quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power have not been explored
to date. Using theoretically implied bounds on the discount factor (δ ∈ [0,1]) and recognition
probabilities (q ∈ [0,
Np















The upper bound of this restriction simply requires that committee members oﬀer non-
negative project spending to non-committee members. While this upper bound is somewhat
uninformative, the lower bound has more power: using the observed coalition sizes, the minimum
value of proposal power was $57 million in 1991 and $20 million in 1998. While the point
estimates in Table 4 fall in this restricted range for the 1998 authorization, the estimated value
of proposal power for 1991 is below the theoretically-implied minimum. The ﬁnal row of Table
4 provides a more formal statistical test of these quantitative restrictions, based on the following
one-sided null and alternative hypotheses:





(Nd − Np)N−c + NcNd
¸
(15)





(Nd − Np)N−c + NcNd
¸
(16)
B a s e du p o nas t a n d a r d5p e r c e n ts i g n i ﬁcance level, the tests reject the quantitative restrictions
for the 1991 authorization but fail to reject the restrictions for the 1998 authorization. Thus,
the 1991 data support the qualitative restrictions of the theoretical model, a positive value
of proposal power, and the 1998 data support both the qualitative and the more powerful
quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power.
As a ﬁrst robustness check of these baseline results, the ﬁn a lt w oc o l u m n so fT a b l e4p r o -
vide OLS estimates with control variables. While committee membership explains a signiﬁcant
I calculated heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors as a robustness check. These standard errors, not
presented here, are similar to the standard errors in Table 4. Also, Tobit estimates, which account explicitly
for zero spending in some districts, are not presented here but provide similar estimates of the value of proposal
power.
13share of the distribution of projects, other factors may have also played a role in the bargaining
process. Most importantly, although the theoretical model assumes homogenous preferences
across Congressional districts, preferences for transportation services likely vary, and represen-
tatives from districts with a strong preference for transportation services may face incentives
to serve on the transportation committee. This self-selection may bias upwards the estimates
of the value of proposal power in the baseline speciﬁcation. To account for this possibility of
heterogeneity in preferences, the ﬁnal two columns provide estimates conditional on the follow-
ing observable measures of preferences for transportation services: district area, percent urban,
median income, and industry employment composition.
The results of this regression demonstrate that the inclusion of these variables does not
signiﬁcantly add explanatory power, as the R-squared rises from 0.2459 to 0.2647 using the
1991 data and from 0.2959 to 0.3327 in the 1998 estimates. In both years, rural districts
secure more funding than do urban districts. Even conditional on these observable control
variables, the estimated value of proposal power, the coeﬃcient on committee membership,
changes only slightly and the tests of the qualitative and quantitative restrictions are similar
to those associated with the baseline speciﬁcations.
5.4 Estimation of Underlying Parameters
The preceding analysis uses the theoretical model to provide testable restrictions on the ge-
ographic distribution of federal funds. This logic can also be reversed: given a distribution
of funds, which parameters from the theoretical model could generate the observed outcome?
This section uses the baseline 1998 estimated value of proposal power, which fell in the quantita-
tive bounds implied by the theoretical model, in order to estimate these underlying parameters.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,o n ec a n n o tu s et h es i n g l ee s t i m a t e dv a l u eo fp r o p o s a lp o w e r( β) to separately
identify the two key bargaining parameters (δ,q). Rather, I use two alternative approaches,
which are described below.
First, given its frequent use in the theoretical literature on legislative bargaining, consider
equal recognition probabilities (q = Np/Nd). Under this assumption, the implied discount rate










Using the baseline estimated value of proposal power (β =2 4 .6298), the estimated discount
factor, which is presented in Table 5, equals 0.9837.14
14This estimate suggests signiﬁcant patience on the part of legislators and, under the interpretation the discount
factor as a re-election rate, is consistent with the high incumbency re-election rate (which was roughly 98 percent
14The second approach places joint bounds on the two parameters using the estimated value
of proposal power and restrictions on the parameter space. To generate these bounds, solve












Figure 4 plots this relationship between the recognition probability and the discount factor
using the assumed bounds on the discount factor (δ ∈ [0,1]) and future recognition probabilities
(q ∈ [0,
Np
Nd−Np]). As shown, this approach places tight bounds on the two parameters, allowing
one to rule out a wide range of parameter values. These lower and upper bounds are displayed
in the ﬁnal two columns of Table 5.
6 Alternative Legislative Theories
This section empirically addresses the following alternative theories of legislative organization
and behavior: 1) partisan models, 2) models with committees as informational specialists, 3)
models that explicitly account for the role of appropriators, and 4) models with committee
members as preference outliers. Several of these models, as will be discussed below, provide
alternative explanations for the positive correlation between project spending and membership
on the transportation committee; wherever possible, I will attempt to incorporate additional
variables in order to distinguish between these alternative theories and the baseline model of
legislative bargaining.
6.1 Partisan models
Political parties play a key role in the organization and operation of legislatures.15 Of particular
interest for this study is the role of majority party leaders in the organization and operation
of Congressional committees. Committee chairs, who may have substantial within-committee
bargaining power, are members of the majority party and are appointed by party leaders.
Thus, while the committee may have signiﬁcant proposal power, this power was granted by the
majority party and thus may be ultimately used to further partisan objectives.
In order to address the role of political parties in Congressional committees, I incorpo-
rate measures of representative aﬃl i a t i o nw i t ht h em a j o r i t yp a r t y ,a n dc o l u m n1o fT a b l e6
among incuments seeking re-election) in 1998.
15While this literature on political parties is too voluminous to survey here, interested readers can consult
Rohde (1991) and Krehbiel (1993) for an introduction to the literature.
15presents of the results of this regression. To conserve space, the regressions are pooled across
the two authorization periods, and, given that redistricting occurred between 1991 and 1998,
standard errors are clustered at the state, rather than Congressional district, level. As shown,
conditional on membership on the transportation committee, which retains a positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant eﬀect, there is no evidence of an additional beneﬁt associated with majority
party aﬃliation as this coeﬃcient is small, negative, and statistically insigniﬁcant. I also esti-
mated a speciﬁcation, not reported here, that included an interaction term between committee
membership and majority party aﬃliation but found no evidence of a diﬀerential partisan ben-
eﬁt for committee members, relative to non-committee members. In summary, aﬃliation with
the majority party does not signiﬁcantly alter the cross-district distribution of funds, and the
coeﬃcient on committee membership remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
6.2 Informational models
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) provide a theory of committees based upon informational spe-
cialization. In this model, committees uses this information in order to enact policies with
better outcomes, which beneﬁts both committee and non-committee members. In particular,
this improvement in outcomes is formulated as a reduction in the uncertainty associated with
policy beneﬁts. As a type of quid-pro-quo for the costly acquisition of this information, the
ﬂoor provides the committee with a closed rule, which moves the equilibrium policy closer to
the committee’s most preferred policy. This generalized model has empirical predictions that
are similar to those of the baseline model: proposal power is valuable to committees. Taking
a broader view, however, proposal power is valuable only because this power was delegated
to the committee as part of an agreement that ultimately beneﬁts non-committee members.16
While this informational model of committees incorporates only a single dimensional policy, as
opposed to the multidimensional policy space inherent in bargaining over the distribution of
federal funds, similar ideas may apply in a multidimensional setting. In exchange for the costly
acquisition of information regarding transportation issues, the House may have provided the
committee with a closed rule and the resulting disproportionate project beneﬁts for committee
members.
In order to empirically address the predictions of this generalized model, I incorporate mea-
sures of potential diﬀerences in informational specialization within the committee. To the
extent that legislators are rewarded for the costly acquisition of information, there should pre-
16This informational model of committees belongs to a larger literature arguing that legislatures are majori-
tarian institutions, adopting rules and procedures that ultimately beneﬁt the median legislator. For empirical
evidence on this point, see, among others, Krehbiel’s (1996) study of the airline smoking ban.
16sumably be, in addition to a premium paid to committee members, a within-committee premium
paid to well-informed members. Indeed, the transportation committee is organized in this very
fashion: members on the surface transportation subcommittee, a subset of roughly two-thirds
of members on the transportation authorization committee, are charged with responsibility
over policy issues surrounding the adoption of the transportation authorization bill. Other
transportation funding, such as federal grants to airports, were provided under separate autho-
rization bills that were charged to other subcommittees, such as aviation. As shown in column
2 of Table 6, however, there is no additional eﬀe c ta s s o c i a t e dw i t hm e m b e r s h i po nt h es u r -
face transportation subcommittee, and the baseline committee coeﬃcient remains positive and
statistically signiﬁcant. While subcommittee members do receive more than non-committee
members, as reﬂected in the baseline coeﬃcient on committee membership, there is no evidence
of any within-committee informational specialization in surface transportation that is rewarded
with higher payments to the Congressional district.
6.3 The role of appropriators
While the empirical analysis focused on the role of the authorization committee and the asso-
ciated authorization bill, which provides a multi-year legal basis for transportation spending,
transportation funds must subsequently be appropriated, or made available for spending by
federal agencies, on an annual basis. This multiplicity of authority has led to a turf bat-
tle over control of the process and the resulting geographic distribution of funds between the
authorization and appropriations committees.
Schick (2000) argues that, at least within the sphere of federal transportation policy, this
jurisdictional battle has been largely won by the authorization committee.17 In 1993, two years
following passage of the 1991 transportation authorization bill, the appropriations committee
attempted to redirect $300 million in funding from projects speciﬁed in the authorization bill
to 58 projects outlined in the appropriations bill; many of these new projects were located
in Michigan, the state represented by the chair of the House Transportations Appropriations
Subcommitee. The Rules Committee ultimately sided with the authorization committee,
ﬁnding that these 58 projects represented unauthorized appropriations, and the new projects
were stricken from the appropriations bill. Following the passage of the 1998 authorization
bill, the appropriations committee did insert a handful of new projects; these projects, however,
were far fewer in number than those included in the authorization bill, were in addition to,
rather than replacements for, authorized projects, and were arguably unanticipated during the
1998 passage of the authorization bill given the victory of the authorization committee over
17See, in particular, pages 178-180.
17appropriators in 1993.18
The lesson from this episode is that, broadly speaking, the authorization committee con-
trolled the geographic distribution of funds during this period, while the appropriations com-
mittee controlled the timing of the spending. In order to test for whether or not this control
over the timing provides appropriators with bargaining power during the authorization process,
I next include regressors indicating membership on the Transportation Appropriations Subcom-
mittee at the time of passage of the authorization bill; no representatives were members of both
the authorization and appropriations committee. As shown in column 3 of Table 6, there is
no evidence that appropriators received additional project funding on the margin as this co-
eﬃcient is small and statistically insigniﬁcant; the coeﬃcient on the authorization committee
membership, however, remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant. It is important to note
that these results are not necessarily generalizable to other federal spending programs as the
strong role for authorizers in the transportation program is somewhat unique. Funds for many
federal programs are appropriated without authorizing legislation; according to Schick (2000),
such unauthorized appropriations accounted for 40 percent of total non-defense appropriations
in ﬁscal year 2000.
Finally, column 4 includes controls for all three of the political measures described above
as well as two additional political measures often employed in empirical studies, such as Levitt
and Poterba (1999), on the geographic distribution of federal funds: chair of other committees
and tenure, deﬁned as the number of years served in Congress. The ﬁrst measure controls for
the possibility of logrolling across committees, while the second accounts for the importance
of seniority in the Congressional committee system. As shown, none of the three measures
described above have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the geographic distribution of trans-
portation projects. In addition, there is no evidence of logrolling across committees as the
coeﬃcient on chair of other committees has a counterintuitive negative sign and is statistically
signiﬁcant.19 Increases in tenure, or seniority, do have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the distribution of funds. After controlling for these other political factors, however,
membership on the transportation committee continues to have a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the distribution of transportation projects.
18For example, the approriations committee included in the 2000 appropriations bill $600 million in funding
for the Wodrow Wilson Bridge in the Washington, DC area (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 2000).
19This negative coeﬃcient may reﬂect retaliation in 1998 by the transportation committee against Republican
party leaders regarding a 1997 dispute over the level of transportation funding in the Congressional budget
resolution (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1997).
186.4 Committees as Preference Outliers
The ﬁnal alternative theory of legislatures involves diﬀerences between committee and non-
committee legislators. In particular, many have argued that legislators choose to serve on
committees vital to their constituent interests and thus committees consist of “preference out-
liers”.20 This self-selection of legislators from districts with strong preferences for transporta-
tion projects could explain the positive correlation between transportation project funding and
committee representation.21 Although the regressions have included observable measures of
preferences for transportation services, there may be important unobservable factors, such as
the physical condition of highways in the district, that play an important role in the assignment
of representatives to committees.
I use two approaches to address this possibility of self-selection onto committees: ﬁxed ef-
fects and instrumental variables. Regarding the ﬁrst approach, there were signiﬁcant changes
in committee membership during the sample period. Following the Republican takeover of
Congress in 1995, committees were re-organized; in addition to changing the partisan compo-
sition of committees to reﬂect the new Republican majority, Congress voted to both eliminate
three standing committees and limit the number of committee assignments per representative
to two. Prior to 1994, some representatives served on three Congressional committees. In
addition, the transportation authorization committee, named the Public Works and Trans-
portation Committee in 1991, was expanded from 55 members to 72 members by 1998, when
the committee had been re-named Transportation and Infrastructure.
Unfortunately, redistricting for the 1992 elections complicates the matching process. Us-
ing maps of Congressional district borders from the Census Bureau publication Congressional
District Atlas, I have attempted to link districts in 1998 with a 1991 counterpart. Whenever
possible, I then corroborated this match by both tracking the districts in which 1991 incum-
bents ran for re-election in 1992 and consulting descriptions of districts, which in some cases
explained the relationship between district borders before and after redistricting (Politics in
America, 1992). Overall, I was able to match 394 out of 435 districts in 1998 to a 1991 coun-
terpart; thus, for 41 districts, no reasonable match could be found. Note that, for the 394
20See, for example, Londregan and Snyder (1994) and Groseclose (1994). Krehbiel (1990) ﬁnds less support
for the preference outlier hypothesis.
21Introducing heterogeneity in preferences for public goods into a simple version of the legislative bargaining
model, one with a single period of bargaining and exogenous default payments, has an ambiguous eﬀect on
payments to districts. Votes of representatives from those districts with a strong preference for transportation
projects are cheaper to secure; thus, these districts are more likely to be included in the coalition but, conditional
on inclusion in the coalition, receive smaller payments. The universalism model of Weingast, Shepsle, and
Johnsen (1981), an alternative to the legislative bargaining model, by contrast, predicts a positive correlation
between preferences for public goods and equilibrium payments.
19matches, these are approximate, rather than exact, counterparts as all Congressional districts
experienced at least minor changes in boundaries between 1991 and 1998. Even in states in
which the number of districts was unchanged, district boundaries were altered to reﬂect changes
in the within-state distribution of population.22 Of these 394 matched districts, a signiﬁcant
number experienced a change in committee representation, with 35 districts gaining seats and
26 losing seats.
Column 1 of Table 7 provides the ﬁxed eﬀects results for this matched sample of 394 districts.
Note that, in the special case of only two time periods, ﬁxed eﬀects estimates are quantitatively
identical to regressions of changes in project spending on changes in committee representation.23
As shown, changes in committee membership also correspond to changes in project funding as
the coeﬃcient remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant, supporting the predictions of the
legislative bargaining model.
Given the redistricting-related diﬃculties in matching 1998 districts to an exact 1991 coun-
terpart, I next conduct an alternative matched analysis that uses states, whose borders did not
change between these two authorization years, as the unit of observation. All variables are
averaged across districts within the state. This state-level speciﬁcation can be generated by











(α + βPd + ud) (19)
While this analysis has the beneﬁt of direct geographic matching of states in 1991 and 1998, the
drawbacks, relative to the matched Congressional district analysis, are two-fold. First, there is
a loss of information in aggregating outcomes from the district to the state level. Second, there
is a loss of power from the reduced sample size. Column 2 provides the estimates from this state-
level ﬁxed eﬀects analysis. Again, the state-level estimates support the qualitative restrictions
on the value of proposal power, as the committee coeﬃcients are large and statistically diﬀerent
from zero. In summary, both the district and state ﬁxed eﬀects analyses provide strong support
for the qualitative prediction of a positive value of proposal power.
One potential drawback of ﬁxed eﬀects analyses, at both the district-level and state-level, in-
volves endogenous changes in committee membership. In particular, residents of those districts
22Of course, this statement does not apply to states with a single Congressional district.
23To see this, note that the ﬁxed eﬀects regression model can be written using deviations from the sample
means: gdt − gd = β(Ptd − Pd)+( utd − ud) where t =1 ,2 i n d e x e st h et w oy e a r s . N o t et h a tw i t ho n l yt w o
time periods, gd =( gd1 + gd2)/2 and thus gd1 − gd = −∆gd/2 and gd2 − gd = ∆gd/2 and similarly for the
c o m m i t t e ev a r i a b l e( Pdt). Thus, ﬁxed eﬀects regressions with two time periods are identical to regressions in
ﬁrst diﬀerences.
20securing signiﬁcant funds in the 1991 due to membership on the transportation committee may
experience diminished marginal utility from transportation projects in 1998 and thus choose
to transfer oﬀ of the committee. To address this limitation of the ﬁxed eﬀects analysis, I
also perform an alternative instrumental variables analysis using the presence of newly elected
members as an instrument for committee representation. This instrument arguably satisﬁes
the two criteria for a valid instrument: explanatory power and exogeneity. Regarding explana-
tory power, this choice of instrument is motivated by increases in the size of the transportation
authorization committee witnessed during periods just preceding passage of the authorizing
legislation. In particular, between the 1989-1990 legislative session and the 1991-1992 session,
the committee grew from 49 members to 55 members, while the committee grew even more
substantially, from 60 to 72 members, between the 1995-1996 session and the 1997-1998 ses-
sion. Schick (2000) argues that such increases in authorization committee sizes may have been
designed to increase their power in the jurisdictional battle against appropriators described
above, and the most likely candidates for new committee members are newly elected members,
who have no pre-existing committee responsibilities. Indeed, the ﬁrst stage results, shown in
column 3, demonstrate that newly elected members are roughly eight percentage points more
likely to be included on the transportation committee, a large eﬀect relative to a baseline com-
mittee membership rate of 15 percent, and this relationship is statistically signiﬁcant at the 95
percent level. The second requirement for a valid instrument is exogeneity; that is, the newly
elected indicator should aﬀect project spending only through committee representation. While
newly elected members certainly have less political power than other members, a potential di-
rect eﬀect on project spending, note that these results are conditional on a linear measure of
tenure and the instrument thus captures only the non-linearity associated with being a newly
elected member. As shown in the second stage results in column 4 of Table 7, after correcting
for the possibility of self-selection onto the committee, committee membership continues to
have a positive and strong eﬀect on the distribution of transportation funds.24 The standard
error, however, is signiﬁcantly larger, likely reﬂecting the loss in power from focusing on a single
determinant, newly elected representatives, of committee representation, and the coeﬃcient is
statistically signiﬁcant at only the 90 percent level.
24Given that committee membership is endogenous, membership on the surface transportation subcommittee, a
subset of committee members, is also endogenous. Thus, I drop this subcommittee variable from the instrumental
variables analysis.
217 Endogenous Amendment Rules
A closed rule, through its prohibition of competing proposals, plays a key role in the quantitative
value of proposal power predicted by the legislative bargaining model. The introduction of
amendment rights, formally modeled as an open rule under which ﬂoor members can oﬀer
alternative proposals, results in the possibility of delay in equilibrium, larger coalition sizes,
larger payments to coalition members, and thus a lower value of proposal power (Baron and
Ferejohn, 1989). While the theoretical model assumed the exogenous assignment of a closed
rule, the choice of rule in the U.S. House is made endogenously, through majority vote by
the ﬂoor. This endogeneity of the choice of amendment rules raises a puzzle: why would the
ﬂoor be willing to vote in favor of a closed rule that transfers resources from non-committee
members to committee members? I argue here that the resolution of this puzzle lies in the
timing of the vote over the rule. More speciﬁcally, during the passage of both transportation
authorization bills, the House ﬂoor voted to approve a closed rule after the committee’s bill,
and most notably the distribution of projects across districts, was made publicly available.25
Thus, non-committee members who received projects under the committee’s proposal may
have preferred the certainty of inclusion in the coalition under the committee’s proposal with
a closed rule to the possibilities of delay and exclusion from the coalition under an open rule;
the introduction of risk aversion would only serve to reinforce this preference.
As empirical evidence on this hypothesis, Table 8 displays the results from a Probit analysis
of voting over the closed rule. As shown, in both 1991 and 1998, the probability of supporting
the closed rule was increasing in project funding for the district under the committee’s proposal,
and this relationship is statistically signiﬁcant in both years. Conditional on project spending
in the district, committee members were also more likely to vote in support of the closed rule,
although this relationship was not signiﬁcant at conventional levels in either year. Taken
together, the sequencing of the vote over the closed rule after the distribution of projects was
known and the documented positive correlation between project funding and support for the
closed rule are consistent with the hypothesis that closed rules can be rationally supported by
a majority of legislators, including those not represented on the transportation committee.
25During the 1991 authorization, the committee’s proposed list of projects was made available during July,
while the vote over a closed rule was not taken until October of that year; the closed rule passed by a vote of
302-102. During the 1998 authorization, committee’s proposal was known during late March, a few days before
the vote over the rule in early April, which passed 357-61.
228C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has provided a simple test of the theoretical literature on non-cooperative legislative
bargaining using evidence from bargaining episodes in Congress over the distribution of trans-
portation projects. The evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of the bargaining
model: members with proposal power, those sitting on the transportation committee, secure
higher project spending than do other districts. Support for the quantitative predictions re-
garding the value of proposal power, which are more powerful than the qualitative predictions,
is more mixed. I then empirically address several alternative legislative theories, and, in most
cases, ﬁnd that, after controlling for these alternative political measures, the proposal power
story is retained. In ﬁnding support for the theoretical prediction regarding the positive value of
proposal power, this paper contributes to a larger literature, as surveyed in Poterba (1996) and
Besley and Case (2003), demonstrating the importance of political institutions in determining
both political and economic outcomes.
23AE x t e n d e d M o d e l S o l u t i o n
The following section derives the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for the ex-
tended model under a closed rule. Denote V t
p, V t
c ,and V t
−c as the time t v a l u eo ft h eg a m et o
members of the proposal committee, members of the coalition, and those excluded from the
coalition, respectively. Let V t+1 simply denote the value of the game in time t +1 , prior to
the revelation of the proposal committee and coalition members.
In a subgame perfect equilibrium, a single representative prefers to implement the proposed
allocation if the payment provided in this allocation exceeds the discounted value from continued



















where Nc denotes the coalition size and N−c in the number of districts excluded from the
coalition.
In order to maximize their own payoﬀ, the proposer has an incentive to use the entire
budget, to restrict the coalition size to that required for passage, and to provide non-proposers


























Finally, proposers oﬀer an allocation that will be implemented. Thus, the value of the game
to those excluded from the coalition is zero:
V t
−c =0 (24)




−c = N−c (25)
Nt
c = Nt+1
c = Nc (26)
V t
−c = V t+1
−c = V−c (27)
24V t
c = V t+1
c = Vc = gc (28)
V t
p = V t+1
p = Vp = gp (29)
Combining equations 21—29, one can express the values of the game associated with the













Np(Nd − Np − (1 − q)δNc)
Np(Nd − Np − δNc)+δqNcNd
¸
(31)
B Extension to Within-committee Bargaining
This appendix relaxes the assumed equal sharing rule within the committee. The proposer,
a member of the committee, may now oﬀer any allocation that provides non-negative project
spending to each district. Before bringing the proposal to a vote on the ﬂoor, the proposer
must ﬁrst secure the support of a majority of legislators within the committee. If either vote
fails, a new committee is formed and a new proposer is selected. For simplicity, assume that
the size of the proposal committee (Np) is odd and that committee members comprise less than
am a j o r i t yo fa l ld i s t r i c t s[ Np < (Nd +1 ) /2].
In this extended model, the proposer may prefer to provide project spending to a minimum
winning coalition of districts within the committee. In order for this to be the case, the
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Note that, for the Baron and Ferejohn assumption of equal recognition probabilities (q =
Np/Nd), the costs of securing votes of committee and non-committee members are equal. This
suggests three cases:
B.1 Case 1: q>N p/Nd
In this case, votes of committee members are cheaper to secure and the proposer thus provides
payments to all committee members before extending payments to non-committee members:
Nt
c =( Nd +1 ) /2 − Np (33)
25Since coalition sizes are equal to those in the baseline speciﬁc a t i o n ,t h ev a l u eo fp r o p o s a lp o w e r
is unchanged from the baseline speciﬁcation:




Np(Nd − Np − δNc)
Np(Nd − Np − δNc)+δqNcNd
¸
(34)
B.2 Case 2: q<N p/Nd
In this case, votes of non-committee members are cheaper to secure and the proposer thus
provides payments to just a bare majority of committee members before extending payments
to non-committee members:
Nt
c =( Nd +1 ) /2 − (Np +1 ) /2 (35)
The value of proposal power (Vp−V−p) is decreasing in the coalition size and is thus at a lower
level, relative to the baseline speciﬁcation. While this quantitative prediction of the model
is altered, the qualitative predictions are unchanged as the value of proposal power remains
positive.
B.3 Case 3: q = Np/Nd
In this case, votes of non-committee members are equal to votes of non-committee members.
Therefore, multiple equilibria exist in which the size of the coalition ranges from that of case 1
[Nc =( Nd +1 ) /2 − Np] to that of case 2 [Nc =( Nd +1 ) /2 − (Np +1 ) /2].
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30Table 1





d =0 1 − q q(Nd − Np)/Np
Pt+1
d =1 q 1 − q(Nd − Np)/Np
Table 2
Special Cases of the Bargaining Model
Baron/Ferejohn Rubinstein ultimatum
Parameters
number districts Nd 2 Nd
committee size 1 1 Np
coalition size Nc 1 Nc
recognition probability 1/Nd 1 0
Values of the game
coalition (Vc) δG/Nd δG/(1 + δ) 0
proposer (Vp) G(1 − Ncδ/Nd) G/(1 + δ) G/Np
proposal power (Vp − V−p) G[1 − δNc/(Nd − 1)] G(1 − δ)/(1 + δ) G/Np
31Table 3: Summary statistics, 435 Congressional districts
[sample averages, standard deviations in parentheses]
1991 1998
variable committee others committee others description
(N=55) (N=380) (N=72) (N=363)
coalition 0.3789 0.7851
member (0.4858) (0.4113)
project 54.8377 6.1135 38.4605 13.8307 millions of
spending (74.8663) (11.1448) (19.9686) (12.7047) 1998 dollars
area 5.2667 8.5438 13.6034 6.9314 square miles
(6.0412) (32.1791) (67.2563) (15.0209) (thousands)
percent urban 0.6772 0.7456 0.5835 0.6435
(0.2516) (0.2199) (0.3036) (0.3194)
median income 23.1694 24.1214 34.7242 36.2777 thousands of
(4.0508) (4.8815) (8.1339) (9.5103) 1998 dollars
% agriculture 0.0310 0.0337 0.0297 0.0291 percent employed
& mining (0.0261) (0.0360) (0.0243) (0.0292) in industry
%c o n s t r u c t i o n 0.3389 0.3094 0.2650 0.2455 percent employed
& manufacturing (0.0772) (0.0780) (0.0815) (0.0945) in industry
% transportation 0.0485 0.0488 0.0508 0.0491 percent employed
& communication (0.0161) (0.0163) (0.0157) (0.0165) in industry
%t r a d e 0.2189 0.2287 0.2407 0.2364 percent employed
(0.0254) (0.0268) (0.0415) (0.0375) in industry
majority party 0.5818 0.6105 0.5694 0.5289 member
(0.4978) (0.4883) (0.4986) (0.4999)
tenure 6.7818 11.7500 7.1806 10.0716 years served
(6.4541) (8.4883) (6.0101) (8.1043) in U.S. House
other committee 0.0000 0.0553 0.0139 0.0551 chair of other
chair (0.0000) (0.2288) (0.1179) (0.2285) House committee
transportation 0.0000 0.0237 0.0000 0.0358 member
appropriations (0.0000) (0.1523) (0.0000) (0.1861)
surface transportation 0.6545 0.0000 0.6528 0.0000 member
subcommittee (0.4799) (0.0000) (0.4794) (0.0000)
32Table 4: Value of Proposal Power, Estimates by Authorization Year
[** 95% signiﬁcance, * 90% signiﬁcance, constant not reported]
year 1991 1998 1991 1998
transportation 48.7242** 24.6298** 46.5125** 23.7359**
committee member (4.1002) (1.8260) (4.1472) (1.8118)
area -0.0187 0.0296
(0.0487) (0.0236)
percent urban -17.9295* -10.7392**
(9.7919) (3.1548)
median income -0.2314 -0.0082
(0.3310) (0.0849)
% agr. & mining -42.0968 -35.8667
(58.9174) (33.0946)
%c o n s t r .&m f g . 5.1603 4.3250
(25.3825) (7.8333)
%t r a n s .&c o m m . 148.3692 49.8293
(98.0100) (47.7914)
%t r a d e -49.2555 -25.2836
(63.7762) (20.4651)
R-squared 0.2459 0.2959 0.2647 0.3327
sample size 435 435 435 435
Quantitative lower bound 57.1574 20.1150 57.1574 20.1150
p-value on restriction 0.020 0.993 0.005 0.977
Table 5
Parameter Estimates, 1998 authorization
assuming equal probabilities lower bound upper bound
discount factor 0.9837 0.9412 1.0000
recognition probability 0.1655 0.1537 0.1983
33Table 6: Value of Proposal Power, Alternative Legislative Models
[** 95% signiﬁcance, * 90% signiﬁcance, standard errors clustered at state-level]
speciﬁcation partisan informational model with other political
model model appropriators controls
transportation 34.2782** 39.9293** 34.4335** 40.7989**
committee member (4.4782) (7.9118) (4.4781) (7.8499)
area -0.0096 -0.0137 -0.0095 -0.0160
(0.0131) (0.0117) (0.0133) (0.1393)
percent urban -17.2917** -17.1128** -16.9792** -17.8633**
(6.4409) (6.2020) (6.2335) (6.3870)
median income 0.1027 0.1066 0.1055 0.1228
(0.0837) (0.0841) (0.0820) (0.0804)
% agr. & mining -38.0982 -34.4695 -35.2027 -25.7135
(38.9306) (40.2019) (38.5799) (39.0357)
%c o n s t r .&m f g . 0.3499 0.7295 0.5364 -1.6175
(11.5870) (11.5117) (11.3774) (10.8313)
%t r a n s .&c o m m . 119.4087 115.9121 119.5312 114.5006
(74.0217) (75.1123) (71.7634) (74.2945)
%t r a d e -49.5564 -49.9290 -50.1992 -41.0670
(31.4145) (33.2670) (32.5757) (29.6434)
majority party -0.8877 -0.3398
(2.0207) (1.9899)








R-squared 0.2578 0.2611 0.2583 0.2769
sample size 870 870 870 870
34Table 7: Value of Proposal Power, Committees as Preference Outliers
[** 95% signiﬁcance, * 90% signiﬁcance, IV standard errors clustered at state-level]
speciﬁcation District FE State FE IV (1st stage) IV (2nd stage)
dependent variable funding funding committee member funding
transportation 33.0829** 44.2730** 33.1671*
committee member (6.3199) (15.7648) (19.8000)
area -0.1409 0.3777* 0.0003 -0.0116
(0.3953) (0.2055) (0.0003) (0.0145)
percent urban -12.3450 -2.6130 -0.1548** -18.2933**
(13.5669) (27.4635) (0.0624) (8.1721)
median income 0.2479 0.4559 0.0001 0.1216
(0.3255) (0.5589) (0.0001) (0.0781)
% agr. & mining -7.1874 -168.7841 -1.1308** -30.6805
(113.3305) (197.7724) (0.3699) (47.1319)
%c o n s t r .&m f g . -1.6899 -10.1872 0.2530* -1.5542
(23.2043) (27.3681) (0.1353) (12.4907)
%t r a n s .&c o m m . 215.9713 1045.8480* 1.1870 119.4736
(171.8441) (526.9996) (0.8136) (82.7502)
%t r a d e -36.5677 -93.0453 -0.1799 -42.0352
(63.4150) (134.8721) (0.3430) (30.4822)
majority party -2.0278 10.3594** -0.0013 -0.3597
(2.0618) (4.7610) (0.0187) (2.0086)
surface transportation -10.3691 -19.1402
subcommittee (6.8955) (17.1447)
appropriations 3.8228 49.2057* -0.1266** 2.8240
committee (8.6176) (25.1096) (0.0205) (5.0946)
other committee chair -0.4745 -34.6288** -0.0443 -6.5896**
(5.5160) (16.6631) (0.0284) (2.9540)
tenure 0.4807** 2.2137** -0.0054** 0.4209**
(0.1693) (0.5383) (0.0014) (0.2017)
new member 0.0849**
indicator (0.0371)
R-squared 0.6648 0.8996 0.0581 0.2729
sample size 788 100 870 870
35Table 8: Probits: Voting Support for Closed Rule
[** 95% signiﬁcance, * 90% signiﬁcance]
year 1991 1998
transportation 0.0525 0.7247





percent urban 1.3358** -1.1946**
(0.5784) (0.4302)
median income -0.0713** 0.0015
(0.0186) (0.0099)
% agr. & mining -2.3700 -12.4227**
(2.9581) (4.2969)
%c o n s t r .&m f g . -0.9401 -1.5240
(1.5225) (1.0152)
%t r a n s .&c o m m . 9.2861* 1.9247
(5.5046) (5.5939)
%t r a d e -16.7904** 3.1264
(4.4408) (2.5679)



























































































































Figure 4: Bounds on the Parameter Space
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